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ABSTRACT
This paper empirically examines the key determinants
that

influence the behavior of changes

time

for

the period June 1984

in swap spreads over

through September 1991.

Our

results show that contemporaneous as well as leading changes in
variables such as the corporate default spreads,
Treasury rates,
interest

the

slope

of

the

rate volatility measure,

the level of

Treasury yield curve,
and eurodollar

rates

the
have

differential effects on the changes in swap spreads over time
for interest rate swap contracts with different maturities.

1.

Introduction
Since its inception in the early 80's, the interest rate swap contract has become one

of the most popular corporate fmancing tools and its market has grown significantly. The
outstanding notional principal was more than $4.6 trillion• by the end of 1990. Most of
these swaps (more than two-thirds) represent the simple plain vanilla types of
fixed/floating interest rate swaps denominated in a single currency.
Interest rate swaps have evolved from their original role for fmancial arbitrage to a
general risk management tool (see the work of Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986,
1988) and Smith, Smithson, and Wilford (1990).
Several theoretical papers have been written on the motivation for rational
counterparties to enter into swap agreements. For example, based upon the theory of
comparative advantages, Bicksler and Chen ( 1986) argue that swap counterparties can
benefit from a fixed/floating interest rate swap if the lower credit party pays a fixed-rate
and the higher credit party pays a floating rate in the swap contract. Turnbull ( 1987);
however, argues that interest rate swaps are a zero sum game and both parties can not
simultaneously benefit from the swap contract. Using differential expectations
arguments; Arak, Estrella, Goodman, and Silver (1988) show that swaps are not
redundant securities. They argue that a firm with a better expectation than the market of
its future credit risk will have the economic incentive to borrow at a shon-term rate and
swap into the fixed-rate. This argument has recently been better articulated and extended
by Titman (1992).
With one exception of the most recent paper by Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993).
there has been no empirical investigation of the pricing behavior of interest rate swaps
due mainly to the lack of comprehensive data on interest rate swaps. Sun, Sundaresan,

I This figure was estimated by the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA). see~
Monjtor, vol. 6, No.1, October 19, 1992.
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and Wang (1993) examine the effect of dealers' credit ratings on swap quotations and on
bid-offer spreads. Using two dealers, one single A rated and one AAA rated, their major
fmding is that the AAA offer rates are significantly higher than the single A offer rates
while the AAA bid rates are significantly lower than single A bid rates. Evans and Bales
( 1991) have shown graphically some patterns of swap spreads of both short-dated and
long-dated interest rate swaps for the period between late 1984 and mid 1987.
Furthermore, Litzenberger ( 1992) in his AFA presidential address paper provides some
interesting observations on the behavior of swaps.
The purpose of our study is to use statistical analysis to investigate the behavior of
changes in swap spreads over time for the period June 1984 through September 1991.
The major fmdings in this study are as follows:
1).

For the long-dated swap spreads (5, 7, and 10 years) changes are explained by
contemporaneous changes in the AA Minus AAA corporate spread. The A
Minus AA as well as the BBB Minus A corporate spread do not have
explanatory power once the AA Minus AAA spread is taken into account.

2).

For the five-year swap spread, changes are additionally explained by changes
in the treasury rate level and by changes in a term structure variable. This is
not the case for any other swap spread.

3).

For the 3 and 5-year swap spreads, changes in an interest rate volatility
measure explains changes in swap spreads even after changes in default
spreads are taken into account. This is not true for the 2, 7, and 10-year swap
spread cases.
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4).

Changes in swap spreads can sometimes be explained by changes in future
variables such as the single A Minus AA corporate spread. However, changes
in swap spreads are never explained by changes in lagged variables.

5).

Short-dated swap spreads are related, as expected, to eurodollar rates and not
to treasuries and long-dated corporate default spreads.

2.

Determinants of Swap Spreads and Empirical By,potheses
Interest rate swap contracts are flexible and efficient alternatives to the traditional

long-term and short-term debt instruments. Thus, factors influencing fixed rate and
floating rate borrowing in the traditional debt markets are the primary determinants of
swap spreads. Changes in the long-term swap spreads are likely to move over time
within the range of corporate default spreads as suggested by fmancial arbitrage
arguments. However, additional factors such as the level and shape of the Treasury yield
curve, and the risk and expectation of future interest rates that influence the borrowing
costs in the traditional debt markets, will also affect swap spreads. Short-term swap
spreads; however, are determined largely by the Eurodollar futures market. In addition
the cost of hedging swaps could also be important in determining swap spreads. In the
following we shall first describe the bounds for swap spreads and then proceed to discuss
our empirical hypotheses.

A.

Bounds for Swap Spreads

In the following we will describe a plain vanilla fiXed/floating interest rate swap
and establish the bounds for swap spreads.
In a plain vanilla interest rate swap, one of the counterparties of the swap
promises to pay a stipulated amount of interest calculated at a fixed rate of the "notional
principal" and the other counterparty promises to pay a floating amount of interest on the
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notional principal calculated according to a floating-rate index, such as LIBOR. Both
counterparties of a fixed/floating interest rate swap can create fixed-rate as well as
floating-rate debt of their own. If a firm chooses to borrow at a long-term fixed rate, its
cost stream can be expressed as,

(1)

where Rt is the long-term default-free rate of interest (e.g., yields on U.S. Treasury
Bonds) and DJi is the default premium for the ith firm. The cost stream is contractually
fixed for all periods until the maturity date of the debt.

If a firm chooses to borrow at a short-term rate, rolling over for a desired number
of periods, its cost stream will be

(2)

where rti is the short-term risk-free rate of interest and dti is the default spread for the ith
flml for each period. The interest costs for the short-term borrowers for each period are
determined at the beginning of that period.
A fixed/floating interest rate swap allows the two counterparties to change the
maturity structure of their debt. Let us assume that in a fiXed/floating interest rate swap

finn 1 agrees to pay to flfDl 2 the interest payments based upon a fixed rate which is equal
to <Rt + SS), where SS is commonly termed the swap snead, in exchange for receiving
the interest payments indexed to a short-term rate of interest (rft).
The net effective cost of the synthetic fixed-rate debt to finn 1 can be derived as follows:

Rst

=rtt + dtt + <Rt + SS)- rtt

=R1+ ss + du

(3)

s
A simple arbitrage argument will show that finn 1 will not enter into the swap
agreement unless the cost of the synthetic fixed-rate debt is less than that of the direct
fixed-rate debt. Thus we have the following inequality showing the condition for fmn 1 to
enter into a fixed/floating interest rate swap:

Rt + SS + dtt < R1+ Dn.

ss < Dn - dtt.

or

(4)

The net effective cost of the synthetic floating-rate debt to finn 2 can be derived
as follows:

rs2

=R1 + D12 + rtt- (Rl + SS)
=Dl2 + rtt - ss

(5)

Similarly. firm 2 will not enter into a fixed/floating interest rate swap agreement
unless the cost of its synthetic floating-rate debt is less than that of its direct floating-rate
debt. Thus. we have the following inequality showing the condition for firm 2 to enter
into a fixed/floating interest rate swap:

Dl2 + rtt - ss < Tft + dt2•
or,

D12- dt2 < SS

(6)

From the results in (4) and (6), we have the following boundary conditions for the
swap spread:

D12 - dt2 < SS < Dn - dt l·

(7)
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Thus, we can see that the bounds for swap spreads are determined by the
counterparties' borrowing costs in alternative fixed- and floating-rate markets. The lower
bound for the swap spread is the difference between fmn 2's default premiums in the
direct fiXed-rate and floating-rate markets. The upper bound for the swap spread is the
difference between firm l's default premiums in the direct fixed-rate and floating-rate
markets.
Rearranging the inequalities in {7), we have the following

d11 - dt2 < SS < Dn - D12

(8)

In other words, the lower bound for the swap spread is the difference between the
two counterparties' default spreads in the floating-rate market; while the upper bound for
the swap spread is the difference between their default premiums in the fixed-rate market.
It should be noted from the boundary conditions for swap spreads shown above that the
existence of a quality spread differential between the floating-rate and the fixed-rate
markets is a necessary condition for a positive swap spread in a fixed/floating interest rate
swap. As typically observed, the quality spread in the floating-rate market is less than the
quality spread in the fixed-rate market. Furthermore, the boundary conditions suggest
that an equilibrium swap spread should be set such that the lower-rated fmn (firm 1) has
an incentive to use the swap market to create a synthetic fiXed-rate debt that is cheaper
than its direct fiXed-rate debt.
Knowing the bounds for swap spreads is important and useful. However, in order
to investigate the predictability power of the major determinants of changes in swap
spreads, our empirical analyses will focus on examining the chanees in swap spreads over
time rather than the swap spread itself.
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B.

Empirical H)l)Otheses

Interest rate swaps allow flnns with different credit ratings to synthetically create
flxed-rate and floating-rate debt and hence they are priced in relation to the existing
instruments in the traditional money and capital markets. Thus, we might expect that the
key determinants of swap spreads are the same as those that influence the prices of the
instruments in the flxed-rate and floating-rate markets. The long-dated interest rate swaps
are usually used for creating synthetic fiXed-rate and floating-rate corporate borrowing,
thus we expect corporate spreads to have close relations with the swap spreads. The
short-dated interest rate swaps perform essentially the same function as Eurodollar futures
contracts, thus we expect that the swap spreads are influenced by the Eurodollar rates.
Furthermore, the interest rate volatility, which is closely linked with the business cycles
in the economy, is another important factor that influences the yield spreads in financial
markets. Thus, we have included the interest rate volatility as one of the key
determinants in explaining changes in interest rate swap spreads. The following specific
hypotheses are formulated and tested using the regression analysis:

Hypothesis I: The variations in the levels of swap spreads are directly related with that in
the corporate bond spreads. More specifically, long-dated swap spreads
fluctuate over time within the bounds between the AAA and A corporate
spreads.

Hypothesis 2: Changes in swap spreads are directly related with the changes in corporate
spreads and interest rate volatility. (This is the main hypothesis of our
study. We have used contemporaneous, leading and lagging regressions
for the analysis.]
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Hypothesis 3: Changes in swap spreads are influenced by the level and the shape of the
U.S. Treasury yield curve. For example, the level could be a proxy for
hedging costs which then affects the spread dealers are willing to consider.

Hypothesis 4: Changes in short-dated swap spreads are directly related with the changes

in the Eurodollar rates.
3.

Data and Empirical Methodoloc
The data used in this paper come from three different sources. Swap spreads come

from three large dealers from three different time periods, and represent daily quotes.
Constant maturity treasury rates and eurodollar rates come from the Atlanta Federal
Reserve, and also represent daily quotes. We are primarily interested in the rates on every
fourth Wednesday.2 If data are not available for all needed rates for a particular
Wednesday, we go ahead to Thursday, and if there are no data for Thursday, we go back
to Tuesday. Swap spreads are available for 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years (i.e.;

SSt= The 2-year

swap spread at timet). The treasury rates we use are 3, 6, and 9 months and 1, 2, 3, 5, 7
and 10 years (i.e.; TR~M =the 6-month treasury rate a time t). The eurodollar rates we
use are 1, 3, 6, 9 months and 1 year (i.e.; ER~M =the 6-month eurodollar rate at timet).
For corporate rates we use weekly averages from Standard & Poors. The rates are
for industrial bonds, representing a composite of 7 to 10-year bonds. We have available
AAA, AA, A, and BBB rates as well as a 7 to 10-year composite treasury rate. Since
these are weekly averages, they do not match swap rates perfectly. However, we treat the
weekly average for a particular week as if it is the point estimate for Wednesday. Since
we are focusing on every fourth Wednesday, we believe that using the averages for the
week will not be too detrimental.

· 2The middle of the week is chosen in order to avoid anomalies associated with the weekend effect.

9
The final variable used represents interest rate volatility. We calculate the volatility
of the tenn premium of a 5-year to 10-year composite treasury return over a 6-month to 1
year composite return both from the Fama/Bliss files. We use an ARCH(l2) process to
describe volatility.
The period we use for all data is from Thursday. June 14. 1984 until Wednesday.
September 4. 1991. Thus. since we use four-week intervals. we have 93 data points and
thus 92 changes in these variables. We use primarily five regressions in our analysis.
Each one is done in a step-wise fashion in order to see if variables that are initially
significant become insignificant once other variables are added. We. however. show only
the results for the full regression which includes all the variables. The regressions are as
follows:

.1SS~ =a+ B0 .1TR~ + B 1 .1TS1~ + B2 .1MDS~ + B3 AMDS~

(9)

B4 .1MDS~ + B5 .1MDS~ 88 + B6 .1V + £
· In this regression we are interested in what contemporaneous variables help us
explain changes in swap spreads. It is done for M = 2, 3, 5, 7. and 10 years .

.1ss~ = ss~- ss~ 1 :
SS~

(a).

=M Maturity swap spread at timet.

- TRM
A'TRM
t
t -

Ll

-

.
TRM
t-1.

(b).

TR~ = M Maturity treasury rate at time t.
llTSf

=ll[TR~ -TRrM]

TR~M = 3 month treasury rate at time t.

(c).
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~S~ = MDS~ - MDS~ :

(d).

MDS ~ = AAA corporate rate at timet minus composite (7-10 year)
treasury rate at time t

AMDS~ = MDS~ - MDS~:

(e).

MDS.AA = AA corporate rate at time t minus AAA
corporate rate at time t.

AMDS~ = MDS~ - MDS~1 :

(f).

MDS.A = Single A corporate rate at time t minus AA
corporate rate at time t.
.._" •ngBBB _ MDSBBB

Ll.lYUJ

t

-

t

-

MDSBBB .
t-1 '

(g).

MDS~ 88 = BBB corporate rate at time t minus single A
corporate rate at time t.

v.- v._,

llVt =
Vt volatility of term structure premium

=

(h).

!lSS~ =a+ B0 llTR~ 1 + B 1 !lTS1~t + B2 AMDS~ + B3 llMDS~
+ B4 llMDS~ 1 + B5 AMDS~~B + B6 llV,_1 + £

(10)

This is the same as regression (1) except we are looking at past (lag of one period)
instead of contemporaneous variables in order to explain swap spreads.

llSS~ =a+ B0 llTR~1 + BtllTS1~t + B2 AMDS~ + B3 AMDS~

+ B4 AMDS~ 1 + B5 AMDS~J:B + B6 llVc+l + £

(11)

This is the same as regressions (1) and (2) except we are looking at future (lead of
one period) variables instead of contemporaneous or past variables to explain swap
spreads. The idea here is that swap spreads tend to lead other variables, perhaps due to
liquidity in swaps, and thus the future independent variables can be thought of as
expected future variables when markets have perfect foresight.
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.6SS~ =a+ B0 AER~ + B1 ~TR~ + S2 AMOS~ + B3 AMDS~
+ B4 AMOS~ + B5 AMDS~88 + £

(12)

in which ER~ = The Eurodollar rate for maturity M.
This regression is only run for M = 2, 3 months. Since short dated swaps are
believed to move mostly with euromarkets we would like to see if eurodollar rates are
more important than treasury rates.

.6SS~ =a+ B0 AER~ + B1 AETS! + B2 b.MDS~
+ B3 AMDS~ + B4 AMDS~ + B5 b.MDS~ 88 + £
This is similar to both regressions (1) and (4) in which

(13)

AETS! = ETS! - ETS!_1 : .
ETS~ = ER: year - ER: month

4.

Results
Before focusing on the regression results we focus on some qualitative evidence.

As stated in Litzenberger (1992) and Evans and Bales (1991) swap spreads do not seem
to be as cyclical as A-rated corporate spreads. As shown in Figures 1 through 3 this is
clearly true for the 5, 7, and 10-year swap spreads. However. if we focus on the volatility
of swap rates versus corporate rates we find a different story. Now, as shown in Figures 4
through 6, swap rates appear to be slightly more volatile than corporate rates. This
reversal is clear evidence that we need to do a regression analysis to determine if default
spreads drive swap spreads and if any. which ones drive changes in swap spreads.
Let us give an example of how we might achieve those qualitative results. Suppose
fmt that swap spreads compete with corporate spreads. Thus there should be some
relationship between swap spreads and corporate spreads. Second, let us suppose that
tre~ury

rates are more volatile than swap rates which are in tum more volatile than
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single-A corporate rates, all due to liquidity reasons. Then, it is quite possible for swap
spreads to be less volatile then A rated corporate spreads while swap rates are more
volatile than corporate rates. Again, we need to statistically determine what variables
help explain changes in swap spreads. For example, does the spread of Single A over AA
corporales help explain changes in swap spreads?
Before asking specific questions about short and long-term swap spreads, we first
give a general view of our ability to explain changes in swap spreads with
contemporaneous, lagged, and leading variables. Table 1 contains the results for
regression 1, which shows how welJ contemporaneous variables explain changes in swap
spreads. Our adjusted R2s range from a low of .0214 for the 2-year swap spread to a high
of .188 for the 5-year swap spread. The adjusted R2's for the 7 and 10-year swap spreads
are .090 and .139 respectively. We certainly expect the adjusted R2 to be low for the 2- .
year and 3 swap spreads since as mentioned the 2 and 3-year swaps compete in the
euromarkets and also because our default spreads are based on 7 to 10-year composites.
We, how~ver, are surprised that the R2 is highest for the 5-year swap spread.3
Our lagged and leading variables do not explain changes in swap spreads nearly as
well as do our contemporaneous variables. Table 2 provides the results for regression 2,

in which lagged variables are used to explain changes in swap spreads. The highest
adjusted R2 is .053 for the seven-year case. Other adjusted R2's are all less than .03.
With the leading variables, we are able to do slightly better. As shown in Table 3, for
regression 3 we are able to achieve an R2 of .13 for the 3-year swap spread case.

3A possible explanation is that the S-year swap for much of our period was the most actively
traded swap.
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A.

Loni Ienn SwilP Spreads: Explanation By Contemporaneous Variables

( 1). Default Spreads
We are clearly interested in whether changes in corporate default spreads
explain changes in interest rate swap spreads. We measure default spreads in terms of
marginal spreads; AAA Minus treasuries, AA Minus AAA. single A Minus AA, and
fmally BBB Minus A. From the regressions in Table I (regression 1), we can see how
changes in each of these independent variables explains changes in swap spreads.4 We
might expect from qualitative results such as Evans and Bales (1991) for the spread of the
single A over the AA to be the key variable, since they find that the swap rate stays most
of the time between the AA and single A corporate rates. We find that the spread of AA
over AAA is the only marginal default spread which consistently has explanatory power
for the 5, 7, and 10-year swap spread cases. This may be considered consistent with
Evans and Bales ( 1991) if we assume that Standard & Poors" is slow to downgrade
corporate bonds and thus the AA composite rate might be more indicative of the true
single A composite rate. However, this effect would be most significant only in bad
economic times.
For the 2 and 3-year swap spreads none of the marginal default spreads have
significant coefficients. This does not surprise us for two reasons. First, and more
importantly, the 2 and 3-year swap rates as discussed in Evans and Bales (1991) tend to
compete in the euromarkets. Secondly, our default spreads are based on a 7-10 year
composite. If we believe the 2 and 3-year default spreads to not be that much related to
the 7 and 10-year default spreads, then we would not expect our default spreads to have
significant coefficients for the 2 and 3-year cases.

we look at changes in swap spreads on a weekly basis, we are unable to achieve significant
results. There is too much noise in weekly swap quotes.
4When
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It is interesting to note that coefficients on the AA minus AAA spread for the 5, 7
and 10-year swap spreads are significantly less than one (Table 1). Thus, the swap
spreads move less than one to one with this default spread. This is similar to qualitative
results comparing swap spreads to single A default spreads.
Once this AAA Minus AA default spread is taken into account, no other default
spreads matter statistically, except for one case. For changes in the 7-year swap spread,

the coefficient is significant for the AAA Minus treasuries variable.
(2). Ireasucy Leyel .

In a previous draft we reported that the changes in the treasury rate level

explains changes in swap spreads even after changes in default spreads are taken into
account. The intuition behind this result is that treasury levels proxy for the cost of
hedging. Repo rates can also be used, but we do not have access to good repo data. This
result was based on only the 1984 to 1988 time period. As we extend the results to late
1991, we find that the treasury level no longer explains changes in swap spreads. There
is; however, one exception. Treasury rates help explain changes in 5-year swap spreads;
over and above default spreads. This; however, may be explained by two reasons. First,
the fact that our default spreads are based on a 7 to 10-year composite and thus the
treasury level is partially proxying for the true 5-year default spreads which in turn are not
fully proxied by the 7 to 10-year composite default spreads. Second, five-year swaps are
the most actively traded and thus the most related to hedging costs.
(3). Term Structure
The term structure variable does not come in as a significant variable except
for the case of five-year swap spreads. We even try three different term structure
variables in which for each case we subtract a short rate from the analogous long rate of
the swap. The example presented in Table 1 is for a six-month short rate, but we also use
a 3-month and 2-year short rate. The results are basically the same. This result may be
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explained, just as the treasury level result for the 5-year swap spread is explained, by the
tenn structure proxying for the true 5-year default spread.
(4). voiaJilit.Y
The change in volatility comes in as a significant variable in both the 3 and 5year swap spread cases, but not in the 7 and 10-year swap spread cases. There are two
possible explanations besides the explanation that volatility matters over and above
default spreads for the 5 and 7-year swap spread cases. Firstly, the volatility variable is
already taken into account in the 7 and 10-year swap spread cases through the default
spread variables which are based on a 7 to 10-year composite. This composite might not
fully reflect the true 5-year default spreads and thus volatility could be proxying for the 5year default spreads. Secondly, the volatilities we use are for the return premium of a 5 to
10-year treasury composite over a 6-month to 1-year treasury composite. If the composite
series of the long rate is dominated by the five-year notes, we would expect our volatility
number to be more appropriate for the 5-year swap spread. However, we clearly would
expect the change in the 5-year rate volatility to be related to changes in the 7 and 10-year
rate volatilities.
B.

Lon~

Term Swaps: Explanation b,y Past variables

Table 2 contains the results for explaining swap spreads with past variables
(The same variables used in regression 1). Not one variable has a significant coefficient
for any of the regressions. Also, the highest adjusted R2 is a mere .05 (for the 7-year
swap spread case).
C.

Lon~ Term

Swaps: E:&Planation b,y Ladin~ variables

Unlike the lagged variable case, there are some leading variables which are
significant. Furthennore, when the analogous contemporaneous variables are added to
the regressions, these variables remain significant (Table 3). Changes in the future single
A Minus AA corporate spread helps explain changes in current swap spreads in the case
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of the 7-year swap spread. For the 3-year swap spread, its current changes can be
explained by three significant variables; future changes in the term structure, in the AAA
Minus treasury spread, and the AA Minus AAA default spread. The highest adjusted R 2
is .13 for the 3-year swap spread case.

If we split the period in half, we fmd that during the early years when the swap
market was first developing, future changes in the single A Minus AA spread as well as
the BBB Minus A spread help explain current changes both in the 7 and 10-year swap
spreads.
D.

Explainin& Short Swap Spreads
As discussed in Evans and Bales (1991 ), short dated swap spreads tend to

follow the euromarkets. We provide further evidence of this in Tables 4 and 5. Table 5
can be directly compared to Table 1. The regression presented in Table 5 (regression 5)
differs from the regression presented in Table 1 (regression 1) by replacing two
independent variables. First, instead of using the change in the treasury rate, in regression
5 we use the change in the one-year eurorate. Second, instead of using a term structure
variable based on treasuries, we use a term structure based on eurorates. Also, the
volatility variable is left out. For changes in the two-year swap spread we only get an
adjusted R 2 of .036 and there are no significant variables. For the 3-year swap spread,
the adjusted R 2 is .214 and there are two significant variables. The term structure
variable and the AA Minus AAA default spread are significant.S The significance of the
default spread variable; however. should not be taken seriously because it is no longer
significant once we include the volatility variable.

In Table 4 (regression 4), we analyze the effect of using both the changes in the
treasury rate and changes in the eurodollar rate. For changes in the tw~year swap spread,

Sif we split the time period in half, we find that for the early years these variables are significant as
well for changes in the 2-year swap spread.

17

the eurodollar variable is significant while the treasury variable is not. The adjusted R2 is
.059. For changes in the three-year swap spread, both the eurodollar rate and the treasury
rate are significant. However, once the volatility variable is added, only the eurodollar
rate remains significant. Thus, eurodollar rates are important relative to treasury rates, in
explaining changes in short-dated swap spreads.
5.

Conclusions:
We have shown that contemporaneous changes in a few key variables explain

changes in interest rate swap spreads. The AA minus AAA corporate spread is the major
factor explaining changes in swap spreads for the 5-, 7-, and 10-year maturity contracts.
Our volatility measure helps explain swap spreads for only the 3- and 5-year maturity
contracts. The empirical results also show that both the level of the Treasury and the
slope of the Treasury yield curve help explain changes in the swap spreads for the 5-year
contracts. This could be due to the fact that the 5-year swap contracts are the most
actively traded ones, and thus swap dealers usually take positions and hedge them.
Our results also show that changes in Eurodollar rates play the major role in
explaining swap spreads for short-term swaps (maturities with two and three years).
Finally, expectations of future variables do explain in some cases contemporaneous
changes in swap spreads.
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TABLE I
OLS REGRESSIONS FOR CHANGES IN SWAP SPREADS (CONTEMPORANEOUS VARIABLES)
JUNE 14. 1984 through SEPTEMBER 4. 1991 (N = 92)
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Standard errors are in parentheses.
Changes in variables are for every four weeks.
The coefficient is significant at a 5% significance level.
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TABLE2
OLS REGRESSIONS FOR CHANGES IN SWAP SPREADS (LAGGED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES)
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Standard errors are in parentheses.
Changes in variables are for every four weeks.
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TABLE3
OLS REGRESSIONS FOR CHANGES IN SWAP SPREADS (LEADING INDEPENDENT VARIABLES)
JUNE 14. 1984 through SEPTEMBER4. 1991 (N = 91)
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Standard errors are in parentheses.
Changes in variables are for every four weeks.
The coefficient is significant at a 5% level.
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TABLE4
OLS REGRESSIONS FOR CHANGES IN SHORT SWAP SPREADS (CONTEMPORANEOUS INDEPENDENr VARIABLES)

JUNE 14. 1984 through SEPTEMBER 4. 1991 (N = 92)
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Standard errors are in parentheses.
Changes in variables are for every four weeks.
The coefficient is significant at a 5% level.
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OLS REGRESSIONS FOR CHANGES IN SHORT SWAP SPREADS (CONTEMPORANEOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES)
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Standard errors are in parentheses.
Changes in variables are for every four weeks.
The coefficient is significant at a 5% level.
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